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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2) (k) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Respondent objects to Appellant's Statement of Issues. The 
Appellant's Statement of Issues fails to state issues but rather 
simply contains argument on behalf of the Appellant. The issues in 
this case are: 
1) Was the trial court correct in holding that there 
were no genuine issues of material fact which would 
preclude the granting of summary judgment? 
2) Was the trial court correct in holding that the 
State Farm Homeowner's Insurance policy only 
extended coverage to "accidents" and excluded 
"intentional acts" of an insured? 
3) Was the trial court correct in holding that the 
injuries sustained by Geary were the natural, 
foreseeable, expected and anticipatory results of 
Edwards' intended acts, thus precluding coverage? 
4) Was the trial court correct in holding that since 
Edwards intended to do some harm to Geary he is 
also held to have intended all harm actually 
resulting from his intentional act thereby 
precluding coverage under the policy? 
5) Was the trial court correct in holding that an 
intent to injure may be inferred as a matter of law 
from Edwards' acts? 
6) Was the trial court correct in considering Edwards' 
guilty plea to aggravated assault to establish his 
intent? 
7) Was the trial court correct in holding that 
Edwards' claim that he acted in self-defense did 
not change the nature of his intentional act? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary Judgment is appropriate when the record indicates 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jones v. 
Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting 
Kitchen v. Cal. Gas Co., Inc., 821 P.2d 458, 460 (Utah App. 1991), 
cert, denied sub nom. Kitchen v. England, 832 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992); 
Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc. 789 
P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). The appellate court will review the summary 
judgment for correctness, without deferring to the trial court's 
legal determinations. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989); 
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1039-40 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 (a) in relevant part states: 
(a) Brief of Appe11ant. The brief of the appellant 
shall contain under appropriate headings and in the order 
indicated: 
• • • 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first 
indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of 
the proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. 
A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented 
for review shall follow. All statements of fact and 
references to the proceedings below shall be supported by 
citations to the record. [Emphasis added.] 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: 
This is an appeal from Summary Judgment granted by the 
Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, Second District Court Judge, in a 
declaratory action in favor of State Farm Fire and Casualty Company 
("State Farm") and against Brandon Geary ("Geary") and Brad Edwards 
("Edwards"). The declaratory action sought to determine the 
insurance coverage, if any, afforded under a homeowner's insurance 
policy issued to the parents of Edwards, for the intentional acts 
of Edwards. 
B. Course of Proceedings: 
Geary filed suit against Edwards and Christopher George 
Orchard ("Orchard") on or about May 8, 1990, claiming that on or 
about the 4th day of September, 1989, Edwards had discharged a 
loaded shot gun in the direction of Edwards, striking him in the 
chest and upper body area. (See R. 4-5). The Complaint alleged 
that the defendants acted in a "negligent manner", "grossly 
negligent manner with a reckless disregard for the safety and well 
being of the plaintiff" and that the actions constituted "an 
assault and batter [sic] upon the person of the plaintiff." The 
Complaint sought compensatory, special and punitive damages. This 
lawsuit will hereinafter be referred to as "the underlying action." 
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On or about September 17, 1990, State Farm filed its complaint 
seeking declaratory relief pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1, 
et. seg., to determine whether coverage is afforded to Edwards, 
under the homeowner's insurance policy issued to Edwards' parents, 
for the acts alleged in the underlying lawsuit. Edwards did not 
answer the declaratory action. A Notice of Intent to Default was 
filed with the Court on April 9, 1991. Geary moved to intervene in 
the declaratory action on behalf of Edwards. The Court did not 
rule on the Motion to Intervene. 
Geary did appear and answered the petition for declaratory 
relief. Discovery proceeded. 
On March 3, 1992, State Farm filed its Motion for Summary 
Judgment, with supporting memorandum of points and authorities. 
Geary opposed the Motion for Summary Judgment. Edwards did not 
appear nor did he oppose the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Oral argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment was held 
before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby on July 7, 1992. 
On July 8, 1992, Judge Cornaby issued his ruling granting 
Summary Judgment in favor of State Farm. An Order on the Summairy 
Judgment was signed on July 22, 1992 by the Honorable Rodney S. 
Page because Judge Cornaby had retired prior to having the Order 
presented to him for signature. 
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Geary filed an appeal in this matter on the 18th day of 
August, 1992. On November 2, 1992, the Supreme Court entered an 
Order transferring this case to the Court of Appeals for 
disposition. 
C. Disposition of Trial Court: 
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby granted State Farm's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, finding that there were no issues of material 
fact in dispute and that the acts of Edwards fell within the 
exclusionary language of State Farm's homeowner's insurance policy. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The relevant facts, viewed in a light most favorable to Geary, 
are: 
1. On or about September 4, 1989, Edwards and Orchard were in 
Edwards' car. Edwards and Orchard had been dove hunting that 
weekend, and were going to go dove hunting again near Syracuse, 
Utah. (Deposition of Brad Edwards, taken April 6, 1992, pages 6-
8.; hereinafter referred to as "Edwards' depo., pp. ".) 
2. Edwards claims that a vehicle containing Geary and Troy 
Sheets approached the Edwards vehicle (while stopped at a 
convenience store) and a confrontation arose. (Edwards' depo., pp. 
8 and 9.) 
3. The two vehicles then began chasing each other on roads in 
the Syracuse area. At one point the vehicles stopped and Edwards 
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told Geary that he would shoot him if Geary did not leave him 
alone. Edwards then got in his car and continued to drive away. 
The Geary vehicle continued to follow the Edwards vehicle. 
(Edwards' depo., pp. 26, 27.) 
4. After driving some more, the vehicles stopped near an 
intersection of two dirt roads in the Syracuse area. (Edwards' 
depo., pp. 9-26.) 
5. When the Edwards' vehicle came to a stop, Edwards 
instructed Orchard to load his shotgun, which was located in the 
front seat, with shotgun shells which were located in the back seat 
of the vehicle. (Edwards' depo., pp. 29-30, 52.) 
6. Orchard, at Edwards' direction, reached into the back seat 
of the car for shotgun shells and loaded the shotgun. (Edwards' 
depo., pp. 29-30, 52.) 
7. Edwards then grabbed the loaded shotgun from Orchard. 
(Edwards' depo., pp. 28-30, 52.) 
8. Edwards then intentionally pointed the loaded shotgun in 
the direction of Geary. (Edwards' depo., pp. 28-30, 66; R. 199-
200.) 
9. Edwards told Geary to "Leave me alone or I'll shoot you." 
Geary said, "You ain't going to shoot me" and started laughing. 
(Edwards' depo., p. 30.) 
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10. Edwards then intentionally fired a shot in the direction 
of Geary which struck the ground near Geary's vehicle. (Edwards' 
depo., page 30.) 
11. Edwards then intentionally fired a second shot in the 
direction of Geary, while Geary was still sitting in his car. The 
second shot struck Geary in the head, neck, and chest, with 
approximately 132 pellets. (Edwards' depo. pp. 31, 70; R. 199-
200.) 
12. Edwards admitted that he intentionally fired the shotgun, 
which he knew was loaded, in the direction of Geary but claims that 
his intent was to frighten or scare Geary, not to shoot him. 
(Edwards' depo., pp. 53, 76.) 
13. As a result of this incident, Edwards was arrested and 
charged with attempted homicide. Edwards pled guilty to a lesser 
charge of aggravated assault. (R. 49-56.) 
14. As part of his plea, Edwards pled guilty to intentionally 
causing serious bodily harm to Geary. (R. 50.) 
15. Although Edwards claims that he told the court at the 
time of sentencing that he had not intended to shoot Geary, this 
claim cannot be substantiated. A transcript of the hearing was 
ordered in the case of State of Utah v. Brad Edwards, Case No. 
891706590 FS. Hal Reese, the court reporter on two of the three 
hearings, had passed away. Other court reporters have reviewed the 
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notes taken by Hal Reese, but have not been able to decipher the 
notes. (R. 68; Appellants Brief, p. 11.) 
16. Based on Edwards' plea, he was sentenced to "zero to 
five" years in custody. He actually served twenty-one months of 
his sentence. (Edwards' depo., p. 39.) 
17. On or about September 17, 1990, State Farm filed this 
declaratory action seeking to determine whether there was any 
coverage afforded to Edwards, under the homeowner's insurance 
policy issued to Edwards' parents, for the acts alleged in the 
underlying lawsuit. (R. 3-9.) 
18. Edwards did not answer the declaratory action. A Notice 
of Intent to Default was filed with the Court on April 9, 1991. 
Geary moved to intervene in the declaratory action on behalf of 
Edwards. The Court did not rule on the Motion to Intervene. (R. 
23-24; R. 26-27.) 
19. Geary did appear and answered the petition for 
declaratory relief. (R. 17-19.) 
20. On March 3, 1992 State Farm filed its Motion for Summary 
Judgment, with supporting memorandum of points and authorities. 
Geary opposed the Motion for Summary Judgment. Edwards did not 
appear nor did he respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 
42-58; R. 87-97.) 
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21. Oral argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment was held 
before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby on July 7, 1992. (R. Ill, 
205.) 
22. On July 8, 1992, Judge Cornaby issued his ruling granting 
Summary Judgment in favor of State Farm. An Order on the Summary 
Judgment was signed on July 22, 1992, by the Honorable Rodney S. 
Page because Judge Cornaby had retired prior to having the Order 
presented to him for signature. (R. 199-200; R. 202-203.) 
23. Geary filed an appeal in this matter on the 18th day of 
August, 1992. Edwards has not appealed the Summary Judgment. (R. 
206.) 
24. On November 2, 1992, the Supreme Court entered an Order 
transferring this case to the Court of Appeals for disposition. 
(Addendum, Ex. 8.) 
25. State Farm sought to intervene in the underlying action 
to present evidence concerning the intentional nature of Edwards' 
acts. The trial court denied State Farm's Motion to Intervene. 
(Addendum, Ex. 5, 6, 7.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Appellant's brief fails to conform to the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure by failing to properly cite to the record. 
2. Summary Judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
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as a matter of law. There are no material issues of fact in this 
case and State Farm is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
3. State Farm's homeowner's insurance policy only extends 
coverage to "accidents". Edwards' intentional shooting of his 
shotgun in the direction of Geary was not an accident. Coverage is 
therefore not extended by the homeowner's insurance policy. 
4. State Farm's homeowner's insurance policy excludes 
coverage to acts which cause bodily injury or property damage which 
is either expected or intended by an insured, or which is the 
result of willful and malicious acts of an insured. The acts of 
Brad Edwards caused bodily injury which was either expected or 
intended by Mr. Edwards, or which was the result of willful and 
malicious acts of Mr. Edwards. 
5. The acts of Brad Edwards were intentional acts causing 
personal injury, thus precluding coverage. 
6. The acts of Brad Edwards could reasonably have expected 
to cause personal injury, thus precluding coverage. 
7. The injuries sustained by Brandon Geary were naturally 
foreseeable consequences of the acts of Brad Edwards, thus 
precluding coverage. 
8. The admission by Brad Edwards that he intended some harm 
to Brandon Geary through his acts establishes, as a matter of law, 
an intentional act, thus precluding coverage. 
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9. The admission by Brad Edwards, in entering into the 
guilty plea, establishes, as a matter of law, an intentional act, 
thus precluding coverage. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPRT.T.ANT'S BRIEF FAILS TO CONFORM TO UTAH RULFS nv APPKT.T.ATK 
AND MAY BE DISREGARDED BY THIS COURT 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 (a) in relevant part 
states: 
(a) Brief of the Appellant. The brief of the appellant 
shall contain under appropriate headings and in the order 
indicated: . . . 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first 
indicate briefly the nature of the casef the course of 
the proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. 
A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented 
for review shall follow. All statements of fact and 
references to the proceedings below shall be supported by 
citations to the record. 
The Statement of Facts of the Appellant's brief is not 
supported by any citations to the record. Facts are baldly 
asserted without any support. In Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 
P.2d 1182 (Utah App. 1987) the Utah Appellate Court stated: 
If a party fails to make a concise statement of facts and 
citation of the pages in the record where those facts are 
supported, the court will assume the correctness of the 
judgment below. [Citations omitted.] "This court need 
not, and will not, consider any facts not properly cited 
to, or supported by, the record." [Citations omitted.] 
Id. at 1184. 
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Due to the Appellant's failure in Koulis to support her 
factual allegations by the proper citations to the record, the 
Court disregarded the Appellant's Brief and assumed the correctness 
of the judgment below. Id. at 1185. See, also, Watson v. Watson, 
190 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (Utah App. 1992), footnote 1; and West 
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah App. 1991.) 
Due to Geary's failure to comply with the express requirements 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and in light of existing 
case law, this Court should disregard Geary's brief in this matter. 
POINT II 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE WHEN 
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT 
AND THE MOVING PARTY IS ENTITLED TO 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that summary judgment is 
appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. B&A 
Assoc, v. L.A. Young Sons Const.. 796 P.2d 692, 694 (Utah 1990); 
Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah App. 1992); 
and Transamerica Cash Reserve. Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 
789 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). The appellate court will review the 
summary judgment for correctness, without deferring to the trial 
court's legal determinations. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 
1989). 
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Geary cites to Brandt v. Sprinaville Baking Co., 353 P.2d 460 
(Utah 1960) for the proposition that courts should be reluctant to 
invoke the remedy of summary judgment. However, even in light of 
the Court's caution concerning granting summary judgment, the Court 
in Brandt affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in that 
matter. Id. at 462. 
Geary claims that material issues of fact exist which preclude 
summary judgment. He claims that factual issues exist as to 
whether or not Edwards intended to shoot Geary and whether or not 
Edwards' actions could be expected to cause bodily injury to the 
Geary. (Brief, page 8). Geary claims that summary judgment, 
therefore, in inappropriate. 
State Farm disputes that material questions of fact exist. 
Even when the uncontested facts are viewed in a light most 
favorable to Geary, it is undisputed that: 
1. Edwards knew his shotgun was loaded at the time he 
pointed it in the direction of Geary. Edwards had specifically 
asked Orchard to load the gun in response to the confrontation 
between Geary and Edwards. Orchard was sitting next to Edwards and 
Edwards saw him actually load the gun. He knew the gun had three 
shells in it. (Edwards' depo., pp. 52-53.) 
2. When the gun was discharged, it was a result of Edwards 
voluntary action, and intent, to fire the gun. The gun did not go 
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off by accident. (Edwards' depo., p. 52.) 
3* Edwards aimed the gun out the window with the intention 
of, at least, scaring the people in the other car. (Edwards' 
depo.# p. 53.) 
4. Edwards intentionally fired two shots; the first one 
missing Geary and the second shot hitting Geary about the face, 
neck and chest area. (Edwards' depo., p. 70.) 
5. Edwards plead guilty to aggravated assault, a third 
degree felony and signed a "Statement by Defendant in Advance of 
Plea" wherein he stated: 
4. I understand that the elements of the 
offense the State must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt are: 
(1) An attempt, with unlawful force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
and 
(2) intentionally causes serious bodily 
injury to another. 
These facts are viewed in the light most favorable and are not 
in dispute. 
In Clark v. Allstate Ins. Co., 22 Ariz. App. 601, 529 P.2d 
1195 (1975), a case cited by Geary in support of his position, an 
insured struck another student in the face and injured him. The 
assailant argued on appeal that the exclusion clause should not 
apply because although he had intended to strike the other boy he 
had not meant to hurt him. In rejecting the claim that the claim 
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of the insured resulted in a material question of fact which must 
go to the jury, the Court said: 
The contention of young Clark that he did not intend to 
injury Niemi does not make the question of intention an 
issue of material fact which must go to the trier of 
fact. Perhaps if Clark maintained that striking Niemi 
was an accident, and that the blow itself was 
unintentional, summary judgment would be improper due to 
the dispute over a material fact. However, the act of 
striking another in the face is one which we recognize as 
an act so certain to cause a particular kind of harm that 
we can say a person who performed the act intended the 
resulting harm, and his statement to the contrary does 
nothing to refute that rule of law. 
22 Ariz. App. at 602, 529 P.2d at 1196. 
Although Edwards now claims that he did not intend to injure 
Geary, only to scare him, those self-serving conclusions are not 
determinative of the issues upon which the Court relied in reaching 
its conclusion of no coverage. Edwards admits that he 
intentionally pointed the gun in the direction of Geary, that he 
knew the gun was loaded, and that he intentionally discharged the 
gun. Had he claimed the gun actually discharged, or that he did 
not know the gun was loaded, perhaps a factual issue would be 
created. However, the admitted acts of aiming a loaded gun in the 
direction of Geary, with knowledge of the fact that there are 
shells in the chamber, and intentionally discharging the gun in the 
direction of Geary establishes conduct which is so reasonably to 
have been expected that "legal intent" is established as a matter 
of law. See, for example, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Maloney, 435 N.W.2d 
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448 (Mich. App. 1988); Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Blanco. 804 
P.2d 876 (Haw. 1990), and Allstate Ins. Co. v. Cruse, 734 F.Supp. 
1574 (N.D. Fla. 1989), discussed in more detail hereinafter. 
POINT III 
STATE FARM'S HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE POLICY 
ONLY EXTENDS COVERAGE TO "ACCIDENTSw 
AND EXCLUDES THE INTENTIONAL ACTS OF AN INSURED 
State Farm had issued a homeowner's insurance policy to 
Edwards' parents, under which Edwards sought coverage. The 
homeowner's insurance policy stated, in relevant part: 
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an 
insured for damages because of bodily injury or property 
damage to which this coverage applies, caused by an 
occurrence, we will: 
1. pay up to the limit of liability for the damages 
for which the insured is legally liable; and 
2. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our 
choice. ••• 
[Emphasis retained from policy]. 
The highlighted words which are defined in the policy. The 
term "occurrence" is defined: 
"occurrence", when used in Section II (Liability Coverages) of 
this policy, means an accident, including exposure to 
conditions, which results in: 
a. bodily injury; or 
b. property damage 
during the policy period. Repeated or 
continuous exposure to the same general 
conditions is considered to be one occurrence. 
(Emphasis retained from policy; underlining added). 
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In order for there to be coverage for liability, an act must 
be caused by an occurrence, "an accident"• In Safeco Ins. Co. of 
America v. Potts, 685 P.2d 632 (Wash. App. 1984), an insurer filed 
a declaratory judgment action seeking determination that it had no 
duty to defend its insured and no duty to pay any judgment rendered 
against the insured in a personal injury action brought by an 
administrator of an estate of an individual who died as a result of 
a backhanded slap administered by the insured. The insured argued 
that he made the slapping motion "to get Mr. McKee's attention" but 
that he had no intention of injuring the deceased. The insured was 
convicted of second degree manslaughter and second degree assault. 
The Court, in citing from Johnson v. Business Assur. Co. of Am., 38 
Wash.2d 245, 249, 228 P.2d 760 (1951) stated: 
[T]o recover under a policy insuring against death or 
injury by accidental means, (1) it is not enough that the 
result was unusual, unexpected or unforeseen, but it must 
appear that the means were accidental; and (2) accident 
is never present when a deliberate act is performed, 
unless some additional. unexpected, independent, and 
unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings 
about the result of injury or death. 
685 P.2d 632, 633-34, (Emphasis retained). Finding that the 
backhanded slap was a "deliberate act", the Court held that even 
though the result was not subjectively intended, the injury could 
not be deemed to be "an accident". 
In addition to requiring that the bodily injury be caused by 
an accident, certain exclusion to coverage are also set forth in 
the insurance policy. The policy states, in relevant part: 
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SECTION II - EXCLUSIONS 
1. Coverage L (liability) and Coverage M (medicals) do 
not apply to: 
A. bodily injury or property damage. 
(1) Which is either expected or intended by an 
insured or 
(2) to any person or property which is the result 
of willful and malicious acts of an insured. 
(Underlining added.) 
The shooting of Geary was an intentional act by Edwards. On 
the day of the shooting, Edwards told Geary that he would shoot him 
if Geary did not leave Edwards alone. Edwards then instructed 
Orchard, a passenger in his car, to load his shotgun. After 
Orchard loaded the shotgun, Edwards took the gun from him, 
intentionally pointed it in the direction of Geary and 
intentionally fired a shot in Geary's direction. Immediately 
thereafter, Edwards intentionally fired a second shot which 
actually struck Geary in the head, neck and chest. Geary was 
struck with a 132 pellets from the shotgun blast. 
Given the language of the policy, and the facts as admitted by 
Edwards, coverage is not afforded by the policy. 
Injuries which are the "Natural Foreseeable, Expected and 
Anticipatory" Result of an Intentional Act Fall Within 
the Intentional Act Exclusion 
A number of cases have addressed the issue of whether the 
intentional firing of a firearm constitutes conduct which falls 
within the "intentional act" exclusion. 
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In Allstate Ins, Co, v. Maloney, 435 N.W.2d 448 (Mich. App. 
1988), the Plaintiff/insurer brought a declaratory judgment action 
to determine its obligation to indemnify and defend its insured in 
a lawsuit to recover for injuries sustained when the insured 
allegedly fired a shotgun in the area where house guests were 
located. At issue was an intentional act exclusion which excluded 
coverage for: 
Any bodily injury or property damage which may be 
reasonably expected to result from the intentional or 
criminal act of an insured or which is in fact intended 
by the insured person. (Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 449. 
This exclusion is similar to the exclusion at issue in this 
case. The Maloney Court stated: 
This court has ruled that a distinction should be made 
between the terms "intentional" and "expected" when a 
policy excludes coverage for intended or expected 
injuries. [Citations omitted.] The Court in Jenkins 
concluded that in order to avoid liability for an 
expected injury it must be shown that the injury was the 
natural, foreseeable, expected and anticipatory result of 
an intentional act. [Citations omitted.] 
Id. at 450. 
The trial court granted the Insurer's Motion for Summary 
Disposition and the Michigan Appellate Court affirmed the trial 
court's decision. The Maloney Court held: 
We conclude that Spicer's injuries could reasonably have 
been expected to result from Fisher's intentional act of 
shooting a shotgun where Spicer was located. Even if 
Fisher did not intend to injure, or even hit, Spicer, 
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Spicer's injuries were nevertheless the natural, 
foreseeable, expected and anticipatory result of Fisher's 
acts. . . . Because Fisher could have reasonably 
expected injury to result from his intentional act# the 
policy exclusion applies. (Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 450. See, also, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Freeman, 443 N.W.2d 
734, 743, (Mich. 1989). 
In reviewing the acts of Edwards, therefore, the Court should 
consider whether the injuries sustained by Geary were the natural, 
foreseeable, expected and anticipatory result of Edwards' acts. 
The trial court in this case recognized and applied the 
"natural, foreseeable, expected and anticipatory result" principal 
of law in its Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment, Conclusions, 
and Decree where it states: 
Even if Mr. Edwards had not "intended" to hit Mr. Geary, 
he could have "expected" that it would happen considering 
his intentional actions. 
(Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment, Conclusions and Decree, 
attached in Addendum, Ex. 2.) The trial court correctly 
determined that Edwards' intentional shooting of the shotgun 
resulted in personal injury to Geary which was the natural, 
foreseeable, expected or anticipatory result of Edwards' acts. 
Coverage for the acts, therefore, was properly denied. 
Under the Majority Rule an Intentional Act Exclusion 
Applies if the Insured Intended to do a Particular Act, 
and Intended to do Some Harm, Even if the Harm Actually 
Done was Radically Different from that Intended 
Many courts, considering whether the intentional act exclusion 
applies when an insured denies intent to do specific harm, have 
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focused consideration on whether the insured, in performing an 
intentional act, meant to do any harm. 
In Allstate Ins. Co, v. Steinemer, 723 P.2d 873 (11th Cir. 
1984), a case cited by Geary in support of his position, the 11th 
Circuit held: 
Under the majority rule [an intentional injury exclusion] 
applies if the insured intended to do a particular act, 
and intended to do some harm, even if the harm actually 
done was radically different from that intended. 
(Emphas is added.) 
Id. at 875. 
In the present case, Edwards has testified that he did not 
intend to actually shoot Geary. Although Edwards had threatened to 
shoot Geary, had fired a "warning shot in his direction", and later 
plead guilty to doing an intentional act (for which he was 
incarcerated for twenty-one months) Edwards now claims that he only 
intended to scare Geary by intentionally shooting a loaded shotgun 
in his direction. 
An intent to scare is an intent to bring some harm to the 
victim. The fact that the harm actually done, personal injuries 
resulting from gunshot wounds, is radically different from the harm 
intended does not remove the act from an intentional injury 
exclusion. In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Cruse, 734 F.Supp. 1574 (N.D. 
Fla. 1989), the intentional act exclusion at issue was the same as 
that found in Maloney, supra. In Cruse, the plaintiff/insurer 
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requested a declaration of non-coverage in connection with shooting 
deaths caused by its insured. The United States District Court of 
Florida granted the plaintiff/insurer's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The insured testified that his only intention was to 
scare the victims and show them that he meant business. The 
insured testified he did not have any intent to injure. However, 
the Federal District Court of Florida held: 
Mr. Cruse's admission that he wanted to scare the victims 
indicates that he intended some harm to them. The fact 
that the harm may have been greater than he intended, 
does' not warrant coverage under the policy. ... In this 
light, Mr. Cruse's admission that he started the events 
in question with a desire to scare people compels this 
court to conclude that, as in Landis and Zordan, it is 
inevitable for some type of harm to flow from the 
behavior at issue here, i.e., trying to scare strangers 
by pointing a gun at them in a threatening manner. 
Therefore, based on these findings, the court finds that 
the intentional acts exclusion in this case bars coverage 
under the policy. 
Id. at 1581. 
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, in Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co. v. 
Blanco, 804 P.2d 876 (Haw. 1990) was faced with a fact pattern 
which it characterized as follows: 
Given the best possible interpretation, Garcia [the 
insured] fired the rifle in Saturnino's direction 
intending to frighten him. That physical injury might 
result from such an action is certainly something which 
a reasonable man in Garcia's position should have 
anticipated and expected. 
Id. at 881. 
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The Hawaii Supreme Court used the same reasoning as Maloney 
that injuries can be naturally expected from shooting a loaded gun 
in the direction of another person and, therefore, fall within the 
intentional injury exclusion. The Blanco Court held that even 
though Blanco's only intent was to frighten the victim, the intent 
to cause bodily harm is present as a matter of law. 
Garcia could not reasonably expect to be covered or 
defended with respect to injuries to Saturnino which 
arose from his intentionally firing a rifle in 
Saturnino's direction to frighten him even though the 
particular injury was unexpected. 
Id. at 881. 
Geary's own case law cites the majority position that a person 
who does an intentional act and intends some harm is also held to 
have intended all of the resulting harm, even if the actual harm is 
radically different from the harm intended. Cruse and Blanco both 
hold that an insured who intentionally fires a loaded gun at the 
direction of the victim with an intent to frighten also has the 
intent to inflict all other actual harm including personal injuries 
from the shooting. 
Edwards' testimony that he intended to scare Geary and, 
therefore, intentionally fired a loaded gun in Geary's direction, 
amounts to an affirmation that he intended actual harm or injuries 
to Geary. The fact that the injuries sustained were allegedly 
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greater than anticipated does not remove the intentional nature of 
the act nor does it invoke insurance coverage for such acts. 
Intent to Injure can be Inferred as a Matter of Law 
In Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Smith, 376 N.W.2d 506 (Minn. App. 
1985), the Minnesota Appellate Court was faced with interpreting an 
intentional act exclusion which precluded coverage for "bodily 
injury or property damage expected or intended by an insured 
person." (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 508. The insured drove 
to the victim's house and fired four shots from a pistol at the 
lower level of the house. The insured testified his only intent 
was to scare the occupants of the house. Further, the insured 
claimed that he purposely fired at the darkened lower level of the 
house in order to avoid the lighted area upstairs and the 
possibility of injuring someone. However, the insured's shots 
killed one of the residents of the house. 
In light of the insured's testimony and the absence of any 
other evidence showing subjective intent by the insured to injure 
the victim, the Minnesota Appellate Court found that there was no 
proof of actual intent. However, the Court found legal intent as 
a matter of law. 
The record is void of any evidence that [the insured] had 
actual intent to inflict injury. Shooting into a house 
known to be occupied by people, however, is an egregious 
act, and intent to injure may be inferred as a matter of 
law. 
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Id. at 510. On this finding the Minnesota Appellate Court upheld 
the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the 
insurer in a declaratory judgment action. (See, also. State Farm 
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Victor, 442 N.W.2d 880, 882-883 (Neb. 1979). 
In State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. King, 851 F.2d 1369 (11th 
Cir. 1988) the insured testified that his intent in shooting at the 
victim's vehicle was only to "shoot out the tires". However, one 
of the victims died as a result of a bullet wound. The intentional 
act exclusion in King is exactly the same as in the present case. 
In upholding the trial court's granting of the insurer's summary 
judgment, the 11th Circuit pointed to case law which held that 
intent to injure can be inferred as a matter of law. See, 
Continental Western Ins. Co. v. Toal, 244 N.W.2d 121, 125 (Minn. 
1976); Woida v. North Star Mut. Ins., 306 N.W.2d 570 (Minn. 1981); 
and Smith, supra. 
After recognizing the rule that intent to injure may be 
inferred as a matter of law the 11th Circuit accepted the trial 
court's finding that: 
... From all the evidence [the insureds] intent to do 
injury was clearly present. 
Id. at 1371. 
The King Court concluded by stating: 
Based on the evidence, the District Court could have 
reasonably concluded that King either expected or 
intended the resulting bodily injury. Therefore, the 
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District Court's Declaratory Judgment that State Farm is 
not obligated to defend or indemnify King is affirmed. 
Id. at 1372. 
The Case Law Cited in Geary's Brief Is Distinguishable 
From the Issues Before this Court 
The legal authorities cited by Geary regarding the appropriate 
manner of interpreting the intentional act exclusion are 
inapplicable to the present action for a variety of reasons. 
First, almost all of the cases cited by Geary interpret a different 
intentional act exclusion than the one at issue in this case. The 
exclusions relied on by Geary focuses solely on the "intentional" 
nature of the act of the insured. The intentional act exclusion of 
the State Farm Policy at issue in this matter, set forth above, 
states that coverage for liability and medical coverage is not 
afforded for bodily injury or property damage "which is either 
expected or intended by an insured". This exclusion (including 
"expected or intended") is broader than the exclusion relied on by 
Geary. 
The authorities cited by Geary deal only with intentional act 
exclusions where the only acts excluded from coverage are those 
which are "intended" by the insured. The intentional act 
exclusions at issue in the authorities cited by Geary do not, for 
the most part, deal with injury "expected" (or, "reasonably to be 
expected") by the insured. See Safeco Ins. Co. v. McGrath, 817 
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P.2d 861, 863 (Wash. App. 1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Steinemer, 
723 F.2d 873, 875 (11th Cir. 1984) (Ariz. App. 1975); Fire Ins. 
Exchange v. Berrav, 694 P.2d 259, 260 (Ariz. App. 1983); and Clark 
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 529 P.2d 1195, 1996 (Ariz. App. 1975.) 
Contrary to the position taken by Geary, a careful reading of 
many of the cases cited by him actually support State Farm's 
position that coverage is not afforded under the factual 
circumstances of this case. For example, in Steinemer, supra, the 
11th Circuit held: 
Under the majority rule the [intentional act exclusion] 
applies if the insured intended to do a particular act, 
and intended to do some harm, even if the harm actually 
done was radically different from that intended. 
(Emphas is added.) 
Id. at 875. 
In Fire Insurance Exchange v. Berray, 694 P.2d 259 (Ariz. App. 
1983), while holding that the intentional act was covered since the 
insured acted in self-defense, the Arizona Appellate Court 
nevertheless found: 
We find in this case that only one inference can be drawn 
from Berrayfs testimony. The action of intentionally 
aiming a gun known to be loaded, at a person at close 
range and intentionally firing it is an act so certain to 
cause harm that it must be said, as a matter of law, that 
the person pulling the trigger intended the resulting 
harm despite his statements to the contrary. 
Id. at 261.x 
xThe Arizona Appellate Court recognized that Division Two of 
the Arizona Court of Appeals, in Lockhart v. Allstate Ins. Co., 119 
Ariz. 150, 579 P.2d 1120 (App. 1978), has specifically reached a 
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Edwards intentionally pointed a gun, known to be loaded, at 
Geary and intentionally fired in his direction. He had specific 
intent to, at least, scare Geary. His act was so certain to cause 
harm that it must be said, as a matter of law, that Edwards 
intended the resulting harm despite his present statements to the 
contrary. 
Clark v. Allstate Insurance Company, 529 P.2d 1195 (Ariz. App. 
1975), also cited by the Plaintiff, is a case where one young man 
struck another young man in the face which resulted in injuries. 
The young man who threw the punch testified that he did not intend 
to cause any injuries. The Arizona Appellate Court held the 
contention of Clark that he did not intend to injure Niemi did not 
make the question of intention an issue of material fact which 
"must go to the trier of fact". The Court found that striking 
someone in the face is an act so certain to cause harm that it must 
be said, as a matter of law, that the person throwing the punch 
intended the resulting harm. Id. at 1196. 
In addition to interpreting different exclusionary language in 
the policy, some of the cases cited by Geary are otherwise readily 
contrary result and has held that intentional acts of self-defense 
were within the exclusion and no coverage would be afforded. The 
Berray court also held that "[a] narrow and literal interpretation 
of the term "intentional acts" would lead to the application of the 
exclusion in these circumstances. However, on closer analysis, it 
would appear that Berray is entitled to at least a defense by the 
insurance company." 694 P.2d 259, 261. State Farm did provide a 
defense to Edwards in the underlying action. 
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distinguishable from the present case on their own facts. In 
Vanoard Ins, Co, v, Cantrell, 503 P.2d 962 (Ariz. App. 1972), for 
example, the trial court found that the defendant did not 
intentionally shoot and injure the plaintiff based partially on the 
fact that the defendant lacked the mental capacity to form the 
requisite intent for such a finding. Id. at 965. 
POINT IV 
EDWARDS' PLEA OF GUILTY TO AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 
ESTABLISHES INTENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Edwards' Plea of Guilty to Aggravated Assault 
Could Have Been Relied Upon as the Sole Basis for Granting 
Summary Judgment in This Matter 
Edwards has argued in his brief that his plea to aggravated 
assault was not determinative of the issue of intent. The trial 
court's ruling shows that Edwards' plea was not the only basis, nor 
the primary basis, upon which summary judgment was granted. 
However, a granting of summary judgment still would have been 
proper even if the trial court had relied solely upon Edwards' 
guilty plea as a basis for granting summary judgment. (A copy of 
Edwards' plea is attached in the addendum.) 
In relevant part, Edwards' plea states: 
4. I understand that the elements of the offense that 
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt are: 
(1) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, 
to do bodily injury to another; and 
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(b) intentionally cause serious bodily injury to 
another. 
Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the "Representations to the Court" 
section of Edwards' plea states: 
6. My decision to enter this plea was made after full 
and careful thought, with the advice of counsel, and with 
a full understanding of my rights, the facts and 
circumstances of the case and consequences of the plea. 
I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, 
or intoxicants when the decision to enter the plea was 
made, and I am not now under the influences of any drugs, 
medication, or intoxicants. 
7. I have no mental reservations concerning the plea. 
The plea was signed by Edwards. 
The terms of this guilty plea are clear and unambiguous. 
Edwards pled guilty to intentionally causing serious bodily harm to 
Geary. 
In Hooks v. Middlebrooks, 472 N.Y.S. 2d 54 (A.D. 4 Dept. 1984) 
the Defendant in a civil action had previously been charged with a 
felony and ultimately pled guilty to a class "A" misdemeanor. The 
New York Appellate Court recognized that the Defendant had been 
represented by counsel and had been explained the ramifications of 
entering the plea and had adequate time to come to a thoughtful 
decision. Under these circumstances, the New York Appellate Court 
held that the guilty plea in the criminal action was determinative 
of the issues addressed by the plea. 
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Similarly, in Merchants Mut. Ins. Co, v. Arzillo, 472 N.Y.S. 
2d 97 (A.D. 1 Dept. 1984), the New York Appellate Court held that 
where a defendant in a civil action had previously pled guilty to 
arson, a plea that was voluntarily entered by the defendant and 
adequately explained by the Court, had collaterally estopped the 
defendant from litigating the issue of willful responsibility for 
the fire in the civil suit. 
Therefore, even if the trial court had relied solely upon 
Edwards' plea of guilty to aggravated assault, summary judgment 
would have proper in this matter. 
Edwards' Plea of Guilty to Aggravated Assault was 
Properly Considered by the Trial Court and Properly 
Used as a Basis for Granting Summary Judgment 
Edwards' Guilty Plea is Admissible as Admission 
Against Interest 
A review of the trial court's Ruling on Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Conclusions, and Decree, (attached in Addendum) shows 
that the trial court used Edwards' plea of guilty to aggravated 
assault as one consideration, among many, in granting State Farm's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Pleas to criminal charges arising 
from the same transaction as a later civil suit are clearly 
admissible as admissions against interest and can be used as 
evidence of intent in the subsequent civil action. See New York 
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Doty, 794 P.2d 521, 524 (Wash. App. 1990); 
and Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. McGrath, 708 P.2d 657, 660-61 
(Wash. App. 1985). In making its decision, the trial court 
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properly pointed to Edwards' guilty plea as evidence of Edwards' 
intent in the present action. 
Geary argues in his brief that the trial court in the criminal 
action may actually have accepted a plea of guilty to aggravated 
assault, not on the express terms of the written plea, but on some 
other basis. This argument was not raised to the trial court in 
this action and, therefore, was not decided on by the trial court. 
(A copy of Geary's Memorandum in Opposition to State Farm's Motion 
for Summary Judgment is attached as part of the Addendum.) 
As correctly pointed out by Geary, there is no transcript of 
the hearing at which Edwards' plea was entered. Judge Page's court 
reporter passed away before a transcript of the hearing was made 
and other court reporters were not able to produce a transcript 
pursuant to the notes left by Judge Page's court reporter. 
Therefore, the only official record of the proceeding at which the 
guilty plea was entered is a copy of the guilty plea itself. 
By the express terms of the guilty plea, Edwards pled guilty 
to intentionally causing serious bodily injury to Geary. 
Extrinsic Evidence is not Admissible to Change the 
Meaning of an Official Court Document 
Geary has argued that Judge Page may have accepted his plea of 
guilty, not under the express terms of the document memorializing 
his plea, but rather under a different interpretation of the plea 
wherein he did not admit to intentionally causing bodily harm to 
32 
Geary. Case law is clear in holding that extrinsic evidence cannot 
be used to change or construe the meaning of an unambiguous 
official court document. "As a general rule, where a court's 
decree is clear and unambiguous, neither pleadings, findings, nor 
matters outside the record may be used to change its meaning or 
construe it." State ex rel. Moore v. Scroqqie, 704 P.2d 364, 369 
(Idaho App. 1985). See, also, Evans v. Jensen, 655 P.2d 454, 460 
(Idaho App. 1982); Parks v. Parks, 574 P.2d 588 (N.M. 1978); and 
Lemon v. Hall, 640 P.2d 929 (N.M. 1982). 
Geary's attempt to use Edwards' later deposition testimony to 
contradict or vary the terms of the written plea should not be 
allowed by this Court. There is no ambiguity in the plea which 
justifies the use of extrinsic evidence. 
Paragraphs 4, 6, and 7 of Edwards' plea, supra, concerning the 
intentional nature of Edwards' acts are clear and unambiguous. 
Further, Edwards indicates that he had been fully advised 
concerning the nature and consequences of the plea and that he had 
understood and had no mental reservations concerning this plea. 
Under the applicable case law, this plea must stand as the official 
court decree concerning Edwards' plea and extrinsic evidence which 
would change the meaning of this plea cannot be considered. 
Therefore, Edwards' plea must be accepted on its face, and 
there is no factual question concerning the meaning of this plea. 
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POINT V 
EDWARDS' CLAIM THAT HE SHOT GEARY IN SELF-DEFENSE 
DOES NOT MAKE THE INTENTIONAL INJURY EXCLUSION 
INAPPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT CASE 
Geary has cited one case, Fire Ins, Exchange v. Berray, 694 
P.2d 259 (Ariz. App. 1983) for the proposition that an intentional 
shooting done in the context of self-defense does not fall within 
an intentional injury exclusion.2 
The Court in State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Marshall. 554 So.2d 
504 (Fla. 1989) was faced with a situation where an insured who 
allegedly feared for his life attempted to discourage an attacker 
by holding up a wooden clubf then shooting a warning shot from his 
pistol, and finally hitting the attacker in the head with a gun 
which discharged upon impact and injured the attacker. The insurer 
filed a declaratory action seeking to determine its obligations 
under his homeowner's policy which included an intentional injury 
exclusion which excluded coverage for "bodily injury or property 
damage which is expected or intended by an insured". Id. at 505. 
The Florida Supreme Court held that the fact that the 
insured's acts occurred in self-defense did not negate the 
2As mentioned above, another Division in Arizona's Appellate 
Court reached a contrary conclusion, in Lockhart v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 119 Ariz.App. 150, 579 P.2d 1120 (App. 1978). 
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intentional nature of those acts and, therefore, fell within the 
intentional injury exclusion. 
... Such acts of self-defense are undeniably intentional 
and have been held to be embraced within the intentional 
act exclusions by a majority of courts. [Citations 
omitted.] 
We align ourselves with a majority of jurisdictions, 
which hold that self-defense is not an exception to the 
intentional acts exclusion and the clear terms of the 
policy control. In such cases, the sanctity of the 
parties to freely contract prevails. ... (Emphasis 
added.) 
Id. at 505. The majority of courts which have held that a claim of 
self-defense is not an exception to an intentional act exclusion 
include: Western World Ins. Co. v. Hartford Mut. Ins. Co.. 600 
F.Supp. 313 (D. Md. 1984); Home Ins. Co. v. Nielsen, 332 N.E.2d 240 
(Ind. App. 1975); Heshelman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 412 
N.E.2d 301 (Ind. App. 1980); Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. 
Krekeler, 363 F.Supp. 354 (E.D. Mo. 1973)/ rev'd on other grounds, 
491 F.2d 884 (8th Cir.); Stout v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 201 
F.Supp. 647 (M.D. N.C. 1962); Clemmons v. American States Ins. Co., 
412 So.2d 906 (Fla. App. D5 1982); Eubanks v. Nationwide Mutual 
Fire Ins. Co., 393 S.E.2d 452 (Ga. App. 1990); Century Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Paddock, 425 N.W.2d 214 (Mich. App. 1988); and Economy Fire 
and Cas. Co. v. Iverson, 445 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 1989). 
In Grange Ins. Co. v. Brosseau, 776 P.2d 123 (Wash. 1989), the 
Washington Appellate Court joined with a majority of courts in 
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holding that a claim of self-defense is not an exception to an act 
otherwise falling within an intentional act exclusion of a 
homeowners policy. In reaching this decision, the Washington 
Supreme Court reviewed the rationale of minority courts in holding 
that an act of self-defense did not fall within an intentional 
injury exclusion. Id. at 126-128. In rejecting the reasoning of 
minority courts in finding that an act of self-defense is an 
exception to an intentional act exclusion in an insurance policy 
the Washington Supreme Court addressed the same issues as the 
Florida Supreme Court in Marshall and recognized that the clear 
terms of the policy exclusion control and the sanctity of parties 
to freely contract must prevail in these cases. 
Thus, Geary's contention that Edwards' intentional shooting 
was allegedly in self-defense and, therefore, not subject to the 
intentional injury act must fail as a matter of law. 
POINT VI 
INCONSISTENT VERDICTS IN THE UNDERLYING TRIAL 
After being granted summary judgment in the declaratory 
action, State Farm moved to intervene in the underlying personal 
injury action between Geary and Edwards. State Farm sought to 
introduce evidence that the shooting of Geary was an intentional 
act of Edwards. State Farm's position was that, given the 
declaratory action, Geary would not seek to establish the 
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intentional nature of the act since a finding of an intentional act 
would preclude insurance coverage to Edwards (resulting in no 
"fund" from which to pursue collection). The attorney hired by 
State Farm certainly would not attempt to establish an intentional 
act by Edwards due to his representation of Mr. Edwards. 
Geary opposed State Farm's Motion to Intervene. State Farm's 
Motion to Intervene was ultimately denied by the trial court. 
That portion of Geary's brief dealing with the decision 
reached by the jury in the underlying action is misleading. The 
issues of the intentional nature of Edwards' actions were not 
litigated. Geary moved the Court, at the conclusion of the 
evidence, to dismiss the claim for an intentional tort. (See 
Brief, pp. 13-14.) 
CONCLUSION 
State Farm's homeowner's insurance policy only affords 
coverage to "occurrences" (i.e., "accidents") which are neither 
expected nor intended by an insured. Edwards' intentional act of 
taking a loaded shotgun, which he knew to be loaded, aiming it in 
the direction of Geary and intentionally discharging the shotgun in 
the direction of Geary, was an act which was either expressly 
intended by Edwards, or was an act which resulted in personal 
injury which was reasonably to be expected. The injuries sustained 
by Geary were the natural, foreseeable, expected and anticipatory 
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results of the intentional act. Although Edwards now claims that 
he did not intend to injure Geary, the nature of the actsf together 
with his previous admissions and his expressed intent to "scare" 
Geary is sufficient to establish intent as a matter of law. The 
trial court correctly entered summary judgment on behalf of State 
Farm. 
DATED this day of January, 1993. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
LOWEST V. 'SMITH 
DANIEL D. ANDERSEN 
Attorneys for State Farm 
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